This paper studies the determinants of executive compensation in listed firms in China between 2002 and 2005. There is significantly positive elasticity of compensation to scale. Moreover, corporate performance is positively related to the elasticity of compensation to scale. We find that both agency theory and managerialism hold true in Chinese listed companies. Compensation contract is the result of the game by stockholders and managers.
Introduction
The determinants of executive compensation have been intensively examined in the context of developed countries 41 . However, there is little evidence concerning China. Given China's second largest economy in the world and its distinctive ownership and governance settings, it would be interesting to see what factors influence top management pay in China. As managers have the opportunity and incentives to act in their own interests at the cost of shareholders, thus an optimal compensation arrangement must be in position to align the interests of managers and shareholders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989; Beatty & Zajac, 1994) , or proper governance mechanisms are designed to decrease managerial opportunism (Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983; Shleifer & Vishny, 1986) . Holmstrom (1979) is based on the maximization of stockholders'interests and realization of agency theory of principle-agent incentive. It built classical model of principle-agent theory. But we cannot find evidence of the existence of firms scale index in top executive compensation contracts. In fact, based on maximization of agents interest, managerialism provides theoretical support for the existence of firm scale in compensation contracts. Empirical research in home and broad found that the scale factor almost existed in firms top executive compensation contracts. It is difficult to explain stockholders inability to find or discipline 41 See Murphy (1999) for an excellent review of the empirical evidences on top management pay mostly in the developed countries. See Sun, Zhao and Yang (2010) for a thorough review on executive compensation in Asia.
executives' self-interested behavior. The only explanation is that the existence of scale factor also agrees with stockholders interests. In China, there is always one largest stockholder in many listed companies. Ways of designation of top executives enable stockholders to influence the affairs of firms. At the same time, the dis-functioning mechanism of monitoring and penalty enable top executives to maximize their own interests.
Based on existent relevant research, this paper uses normative research methods to find the theoretical support for existence of scale factor in top executive compensation contracts. On the other hand, we provide empirical evidence for the existence of agency theory and managerialism in top executive contracts.
Which theory applies for top executive contracts in Chinese listed companies? There is no relevant research in China. The following part is literature review and theoretical analysis. The third part is the relation between scale and top executive compensation. The final part is research conclusion and suggestions.
Literature Review
Managerial power approach posits that powerful executives can influence the compensation decisions made by the board of directors or the compensation committee (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1989) . The primary sources of executive power include the executive's structural power based on formal organizational hierarchy, ownership power, expertise power associated with executives' ability to deal with task environments, and personal prestige power perceived by external constituencies (Finkelstein, 1992 ).
In the past twenty or thirty years, the development of information economics and game theory has enabled many economists to make great progress in the normative and empirical research in agency problem. The principle-agent theory came into existence and develops very quickly. The principle-agent theory was founded by Ross(1973) , Holmstrom (1979) and Grossman & Hart(1986) . This theory set up the model to analyze agency problem. The above mentioned research almost comes from the analysis of mathematical models to resolve the problem of conflict between principle and agent. The standard theory of principle-agent stems from formal model and the model consists of objective function and constraint function. The objective function is to maximize stockholders interests and constraint function is incentivecompatible restraint and agent participating restraint. To resolve the model of principle-agent, we can get general conclusion about the theory of principle-agent. For example, Holmstrom (1979) set up classical theoretical model of principle-agent.
Cost theory and the theory of principle-agent are premised upon the relation between principle and agent. The theory of principle-agent gets the optimum resolution from the design of a series of models to deduction. Based on the reduction of agency costs, cost theory does some research on agency problem. Holmstrom (1979) classical theoretical model began to do some research on top executive compensation. Firms outcome is dependent on the behavior of top executives and random state Top executives behavior and real outcome are unobservable and they cannot become the basic variable of top executive incentive contract. So they must be reflected by the mechanism of measurement.
Under conditions of incentive constraint for top executives, we can get equilibrium resolution. Under standard theoretical model of principle-agent, top executive compensation is only the function of performance index and is not related to firms other characteristics. If top executive compensation is related to firms scale, top executive can get more compensation by changing firms scale and then this greatly increases firms' agency costs (Baker, Jensen and Murphy, 1988) . Gomez-Mejia, Tosi and Hinkin (1987) found that performance is important for compensation contracts in companies controlled by owners and scale is significant for compensation contracts in firms controlled by managers. So, existence of scale factor in compensation contracts naturally connects with managerialism. Rosen (1982 Rosen ( ,1992 explained the phenomenon for more compensation in larger firms by using cloning model. He thought that larger firms had more hierarchy and more subordinates and the caliber of managers can greatly influence firms performance. Larger firms had impetus and ability to employ best CEOs. At the same time, larger firms with more hierarchy and more subordinates magnified the ability of CEOs and larger firms CEOs got more compensation. Banker and Hall (1998) classified firms by scale factor and studied the relation between firms scale and top executives marginal labor production rate. They found that firms scale was monotonically increasing with marginal labor production rate. Cuzick (1985) evidenced that firms scale was positively related to contribution rate by using non-parametric tests. Teddy and Peter (2002) compared the firm performance for top executive and that for firm the same executive worked before. They found that top executive whose performance was better was more likely to work for a relatively larger company. The compensation for which he was paid was significantly related to the performance he had work for the previous company. Obviously, the research result is not only based on the interests of top executives.
The existence of scale factor in top executive compensation contract is based on managerialism. The famous model is Baumol (1959) which was hypothesized on the maximization of sales. Baumo thought that the objective of managers was to maximize the sales. Firms sales greater than the threshold is a constraint condition. When the firms sales meet the needs of stockholders not to dismiss top executives and the firms are not taken over by markets, top executives are more likely to maximize the scale. Managerialism discusses top executives compensation from the perspective of top executives (Marris, 1964; William, 1985; Herman, 1981 and Aoki 1984) . The view of managerialism is that top executive compensation is determined by the scale and less determined by firm's performance. The existence of scale factor in compensation contract stems from the self-interests of top executives. When there is not enough constraint from stockholders and outside markets, top executives are more likely to expand the firm scale than to increase profits.
Why top executives court scale is that they exert influence on scale more easily than on the corporate performance. They are more inclined to include scale in their own compensation contract. Kroll, Simmons and Wright (1990) found that corporate mergers could greatly increase the scale of firms. So, corporate takeovers are the objective of top executives. Top executives can get more compensation by the increase of scale even though the corporate performance deteriorates after mergers. At the same time, top executives are riskaverse. The hope for scale enables the portfolio of their compensation to separate from corporate performance to greatest extent. The compensation connects with stable scale factor to reduce their own risk of compensation (Dyl, 1998; Kroll, Wright and Theorathorn, 1993; McEachern, 1975) . Furthermore, the expansion of scale gives top executives more compensation, thus increasing the rigidity of compensation. So, managerialism is able to provide explanation for non-performance index of scale factor in top executives' compensation contracts.
Hypothesis Development
Hypothesis 1: The elasticity of compensation to scale is positive in top executive compensation contract in Chinese listed companies.
As the corporate performance increases, is the elasticity of compensation to scale constant, increasing or decreasing? Now, there is no study about this. If corporate performance is positively related to the elasticity of compensation to scale, the reduction of corporate performance will result in decrease in the elasticity of compensation to scale. This will restrain corporate managers from abandoning corporate performance to some extent and seeking to expand the firm scale. If corporate performance is negatively related to the elasticity of compensation to scale, the reduction of corporate performance will result in increase in the elasticity of compensation to scale. This will induce corporate managers to abandon corporate performance and seek to expand scale.
Hypothesis 2: Corporate performance in Chinese listed companies is positively related to the elasticity of compensation to scale.
Sample, data and empirical method

Sample selection
Chinese listed companies are required to disclose executives' compensation in details in their annual reports since financial year 2001 42 . However, 42 All listed firms in China have the same financial year, from January 1 to December 31. Annual reports are to be publicly disclosed between January 1 and April 30 during the next financial year. compensation information are inconsistent across firms in their 2001 annual reports, so we choose year 2002 as the starting period 43 . The sample in our study is about A-share listed companies in Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchange. Our data are from CSMAR data base, Chinese Securities Journal, and Juchao.com. Eviews is used for regression analysis. In our sample period annual grants of stock options are extremely infrequent and can be ignored for the construction of the executive compensation measure.
Research model
The first model is as follows:
Lnpay=b0+b1*lnSize+b2*PER+b3*Industry+ b4*Zone+b5*CEO+b6*OUT+b7*Hb+b8*Top 1+b9*Y1+b10*Y2+b11*Y3+ε It is well known that accounting performance, share prices, industry and region all affect top executive compensation. So, we include these variables as control variables. P is corporate market performance represented by the closing price. PER is accounting performance represented by earnings per share. Zone is the region in which the firm is registered. Industry is the one the firm operates in. Our study uses Zone and Industry as control variables to control the effect of zone and industry on top executive compensation.
Chen (2006) found that duality, percentage of independent directors and percentage of largest shareholding are significantly related to top executive's compensation. So, these variables are 43 The disclosure of executive compensation information is regulated by the "Regulation for the Content and We can differentiate both sides of the equation 1 and get b1, the elasticity of compensation to scale. When b1 is significantly positive, the logarithm of corporate scale is positively related to the logarithm of top executive compensation. So, the elasticity of scale to compensation exists.
The second model is as follows and we classify the model into two models, Lnpay=b0+b1*PER*lnsize+b2*EPS+b3* Industry+b4*Zone+b5*CEO+b6*OUT+b7* Hb+b8*Top1+b9*Y1+b10*Y2+b11*Y3+ε
Lnpay=b0+b1*EPS*lnsize+b2*PER+b3* Industry+b4*Zone+b5*CEO+b6*OUT+b7* Hb+b8*Top1+b9*Y1+b10*Y2+b11*Y3+ε
We can also differentiate both sides of the equation (2-1) and (2-2) and get the elasticity of scale to compensation, b1*PER and b1*EPS. If b1 is significantly positive, as performance PER and EPS increase, b1*PER and b1*EPS also increase. So, when the corporate performance increases, the elasticity of scale and compensation also increases. If b1 is significantly negative, as performance PER and EPS increase, b1*PER和b1*EPS decrease. So, when the corporate performance increases, the elasticity of scale and compensation decreases. Note: * , ** statistically significant at 10% and 5% level(two-tailed tests) From above table 1, we can see that LNPAY, the logarithm of top executive compensation is positively related to LNINCOME, the logarithm of core revenues. It shows that there is more likely to have positive elasticity of compensation to scale.
Correlation matrix
Results and analysis
The results of regression models (1), (2-1) and (2-2) are as follows: Note: * , ** and *** statistically significant at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively.(two-tailed tests)
From the regression results of model (1), we can see that the coefficient of LNASSET is 0.216 and statistically significant at 1% level. If LNASSET is replaced by LNINCOME and we run the regression again, the coefficient of LNINCOME is 0.168 and statistically significant at 1% level. The hypothesis I holds true. The regression results show that the asset elasticity of compensation to scale is 0.216 and that sales elasticity of compensation to scale is 0.168 in Chinese listed companies. The elasticity is lower than that in U.S. firms studied by Murphy (1985) and Baker, Jensen & Murphy (1988) . But the result is consistent with the findings by Kostiuk (1990) . The study by Kostiuk found that the elasticity of compensation to scale was about 0.02-0.25 in 73 U.S. large firms.
From the regression results of model (2-1) and (2-2), we can see that the coefficient of EPS*LNASSET is about 0.012 and significant at 1% level. If accounting performance is replaced by market performance, the coefficient of P*LNASSET is about 0.002 and significant at 1% level. If we replace scale by core revenues, the coefficient of EPS*LNINCOME is about 0.013 and significant at 1% level. If accounting performance is replaced by market performance, the coefficient of P*LNINCOME is about 0.002 and significant at 1% level. The above results show that both accounting performance and market performance increase, so does the elasticity of compensation to scale. In other words, when corporate performance decreases, so does the elasticity of compensation to scale. Hypothesis II also holds true.
Summary and conclusions
From the data in 2002-2005 Chinese listed firms, the paper studies the scale factor in top executive compensation contracts and finds that the elasticity of compensation to scale is about 0.168. Both accounting performance and market performance increase, so does the elasticity of compensation to scale. In other words, Both accounting performance and market performance decrease, so does the elasticity of compensation to scale. The corporate performance is significantly positively related to the elasticity of compensation to scale in Chinese top executive compensation contracts. So, top executives must take account of the decrease in the elasticity of compensation to scale caused by the reduction of corporate performance. The relation between corporate performance and the elasticity of compensation to scale is consistent with the view of agency theory in Chinese listed companies'compensation contracts.
Ming, Zhang and Zhen, Chen (2005b) found that corporate scale was positively related to accounting performance. In fact, the expansion of scale will improve the corporate performance. Zhen, Chen (2006) also found that the increase in the weight of scale could improve future corporate performance. The reason for the coexistence of managerialism and agency theory is the result of the game between stockholders and managers. Both sides in the game compromise to some extent and the interests of both sides are included in compensation contracts. So, the coexistence of managerialism and agency theory is the equilibrium point between the both sides in the game.
